A comic critiquing the ability of moral subjectivists like The Amazing Atheist to render judgement of the morality of others.

#168 - The Amazing Anecdotalist

2016-06-04
It is curious that for the host of a podcast where they do nothing but offer criticism of the absurd views of other people, the Amazing Atheist believes the realm of morality to be subjective. Despite negating the value of his own critique the show, called the Drunken Peasants, it approaches it's 300th episode. The basis for much of their reasoning, as was pointed out by show guest Milo Yiannopolous, is their anecdotal experiences and emotional responses to personal injustices.

Here is a suggestion, TJ, perhaps morality ought to mirror the objectivity of another mental construction, mathematics; that is, it should be universalizable and internally consistent. Lacking a logically sound reason to ascribe people, moral agents, any quantifiably greater "magnitude" of moral authority, they would not be differentiated. As such, it would be illogical (and immoral) for people to delegate moral agency to others that they do not innately possess. Example: It would not follow that even though I do not personally have the moral agency to stop you from smoking marijuana, I could somehow empower law enforcement to prevent you on my behalf. Taking this logic to it's extreme, we'd arrive at a realization of libertarian anarchism.

As I suspect that you'd find the notion of true libertarianism to be too emotionally unsettling, at least legitimize your absurd subjectivism by living up to it. As a liberal, I'm sure you believe that there ought to be some monetary redistribution of an arbitrary percentage of people's income to benefit the poor. Instead of waiting for a socialist utopia to do it for you, live by your morals and redistribute the same percentage of your wealth today. After all, it is important enough for you to compel others do it. Surely, it is important enough for you to compel yourself to do it before the law requires it.


UPDATE: This comic inspired a spirited response by TJ here. Curiously, he never actually gets around to addressing why his subjective morality is preferable to anyone else's.

To clarify my own position, which TJ couldn't comprehend, is that morality isn't objective but rather ought to aspire to internal consistency and universality in the face of it's subjectivity. The alternative to this is that morality becomes whatever hodgepodge of inconsistent and arbitrary rules the philosopher desires.